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TRADEMARKS AND TRANSDUCERS: THE FIRST 
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS DECIDES ON THE 
STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED TO SHOW 
WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT IN LANHAM ACT CASES 
Peter Karalis+ 
Look, me and the McDonald’s people, we . . . we got this little . . . 
misunderstanding.  See, they’re McDonald’s.  I’m McDowell’s.  They 
got the Golden Arches.  Mine is the Golden Arcs.  Now see, they got 
the Big Mac.  I got the Big Mick.  We both got two all-beef patties, 
special sauce, lettuce, cheese, pickles, and onions.  But, they use a 
sesame seed bun. My buns have no seeds.1 
In the 1988 comedy Coming to America,2 would McDonald’s legal team have 
been more tolerant of Cleo McDowell’s remarkably familiar restaurant signage 
if McDowell had no intention of attracting customers who associate big, yellow 
arches with a certain world-renowned fast food chain?  If the parties ended up 
in court to determine whether this striking similarity was just a harmless 
coincidence, would the judge use extra caution in instructing the jury on how to 
weigh evidence tending to show that McDowell purposely deceived hungry 
patrons who entered his store seeking a Big Mac?  If McDowell deliberately 
planned to exploit the reputation of his powerful competitor, would he owe 
McDonald’s every dollar he reaped from his willful violations? 
Provisions of the Lanham Act ultimately dictate how these questions should 
be answered.3  Enacted in 1946, the Act protects not only the rights of trademark 
and trade dress owners,4 but also the interests of consumers who depend on 
+ J.D., May 2014, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; M.A. and B.S., 
American University.  The author would like to thank Professor Elizabeth Winston for her insight 
and expertise; Stephanie Martin for her tireless coaching efforts; the staff of the Catholic University 
Law Review for providing an atmosphere of motivation and intellectual curiosity; and his parents 
for their unbounded encouragement and support. 
 1. COMING TO AMERICA (Paramount Pictures 1988).  Actor John Amos played the role of 
Cleo McDowell, a hard-working father whose restaurant bears an uncanny resemblance to that of 
a McDonald’s.  Id.  At one point in the film, McDowell chases away a man taking photographs of 
his storefront, presumably for use in subsequent litigation.  Id.  McDowell is also seen reading a 
McDonald’s operations manual, which he quickly slams shut as an employee walks into his office.  
Id. 
 2. Id.  
 3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2006). 
 4. Courts have interpreted the Act to provide protection for a product’s trade dress, or “image 
and overall appearance.”  Allied Mktg. Group, Inc. v. CDL Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 812 (5th Cir. 
1989); see also 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 8:1 (4th ed. 2013) (illustrating how there has been a “gradual disappearance of 
distinctions between the law of ‘trade dress’ and that of ‘trademarks’”); 1 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS 
III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 5:10 (2d ed. 2012) (“It has been said that there is no 
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distinctive words, names, symbols, and devices to make informed purchases.5  
Infringement occurs when one party benefits from another’s reputation by 
confusing purchasers with identical or similar marks.6  The intent to confuse 
consumers may be a factor in deciding not only whether a defendant has likely 
caused confusion,7 but also the type and extent of remedies available to a 
victorious plaintiff.8  Willfulness, bad faith, and fraud are all terms used to 
basis for distinction between a conventional trademark and a trade dress product  
configuration . . . when considering the rights of the owner of the mark.”).  This includes its 
packaging and design.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000). 
 5. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining “trademark” as “any word, name, symbol, or device, 
or any combination thereof”); see also discussion infra Part I; infra notes 24–26 and accompanying 
text. 
 6. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006) (permitting a cause of action against a party whose 
actions are “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, 
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or 
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person”); see also  
4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:116 
(4th ed. 2013) (explaining that using an exact copy of another’s mark is not necessary to establish 
infringement, as long as consumers were likely deceived into perceiving an association between 
products). 
 7. See, e.g., Versa Prods. Co., Inc. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.), 50 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(discussing how the intent of an alleged infringer “may be highly probative of likelihood of 
confusion” among consumers, which must be shown in order for a plaintiff to succeed in an 
infringement suit).  A finding of intent to confuse is not necessary in order to hold a defendant 
accountable for infringement, but it can be “evidence relevant to whether confusion is likely.”  See 
MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 23:106. 
 8. See, e.g., Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul, 684 F.3d 187, 191 (1st Cir. 2012) (explaining 
that once infringement has been proven, willfulness may be used “as a gloss or screen in deciding 
what remedies to provide”); Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 1390 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(quoting Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Ryu, 960 F.2d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1992)) (illustrating how 
attorney’s fees may be awarded in “exceptional” cases, in which “the violative acts can be 
characterized as ‘malicious,’ ‘fraudulent,’ ‘deliberate,’ or ‘willful’”); see also 4 RUDOLF 
CALLMANN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 23:69 (4th 
ed. 2013) (explaining that a defendant may avoid compensating the plaintiff with an accounting of 
profits made from infringement “if he honestly believed there would be no likelihood of 
confusion”); 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 30:62 (4th ed. 2013) (describing how courts may deny an accounting of profits if “there is no 
deliberate intent to cause confusion”); Danielle Conway-Jones, Remedying Trademark 
Infringement: The Role of Bad Faith in Awarding an Accounting of Defendant’s Profits, 42 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 863, 927 (2002) (highlighting circuits that either demand a showing of intentional 
infringement, or recognize intent to confuse, as a factor in granting a plaintiff an accounting of the 
defendant’s profits); Eugene W. Luciani, Note, Does the Bad Faith Requirement in Accounting of 
Profits Damages Make Economic Sense?, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 69, 69 (1998) (stating that most 
circuits award accountings of profits only after a finding that the defendant acted in bad faith). 
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describe the intent possessed by a potentially offending party.9  Courts may take 
all of these descriptions of intent into consideration in their decisions.10 
Due to an ongoing conflict among the Circuit Courts of Appeals over the 
appropriate standard of proof to show intent in Lanham Act cases, the answers 
to the questions posed in the Coming to America scenario11 may inevitably differ 
by jurisdiction.12  This conflict was apparent in Fishman Transducers v. Paul, 
in which the First Circuit faced a choice between applying the heightened 
standard of “clear and convincing” evidence or the lower burden of a 
“preponderance of the evidence.”13  The court’s decision would determine the 
level of proof required to show willful infringement, which in this case was 
crucial to awarding Fishman Transducers, the trademark owner, an accounting 
of profits wrongfully collected by the parties who infringed its name.14 
The clear and convincing standard, raised by the defendants-appellees 
in Fishman Transducers,15 stems from a Third Circuit decision that hinged on a 
policy of discouraging trademark law enforcement when used to protect the 
subject of an expired design patent.16  Similarly, this approach is based on a 
theory that cases concerning a product design (one form of trade dress) require 
an application of patent law principles to validate the design’s protection under 
the Lanham Act.17  Although Fishman Transducers was a trademark 
infringement case that did not involve a product design, the defendants-appellees 
argued for the heightened standard to ensure that “honest businesses” do not 
 9. See David S. Almeling, The Infringement-Plus-Equity Model: A Better Way to Award 
Monetary Relief in Trademark Cases, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 205, 216 (2007) (explaining that 
“willfulness” covers bad faith and fraud). 
 10. Compare People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 370 
(4th Cir. 2001) (holding that a finding of bad faith is not enough to show “the level of malicious, 
fraudulent, willful or deliberate behavior necessary for an award of attorney fees”), with Tamko 
Roofing Prods., Inc. v. Ideal Roofing Co., 282 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Cir. 2002) (reasoning that an award 
of attorney’s fees does not require intent amounting to bad faith or fraud, but rather only requires a 
mere showing of willfulness in the form of “voluntary and intentional” acts); see also MCCARTHY, 
supra note 6, § 23:113 (stating that “most courts use ‘willful’ as a synonym for intent to confuse,” 
though others define willfulness as merely acting “despite knowledge of the senior user’s 
trademark,” as opposed to acting with “intent to free ride on another’s mark by confusing 
consumers”). 
 11. See supra note 1. 
 12. Compare Fishman Transducers, 684 F.3d at 193 (holding that that willful infringement 
must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence), with Versa Prods., 50 F.3d at 208 (holding 
that intent to confuse must be shown by clear and convincing evidence). 
 13. Fishman Transducers, 684 F.3d at 192–93. 
 14. Id. at 193; see infra Part II.C. 
 15. Brief for Appellees at 19–20, Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul, 684 F.3d 187 (1st Cir. 
2012) (No. 11-1663). 
 16. See Versa Prods., 50 F.3d at 207–08 (citing Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 
376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964)); see also infra Part I.B.1, 3. 
 17. See Versa Prods., 50 F.3d at 207; see also infra Part I.B.3. 
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suffer heavy financial losses and marred reputations “in the absence of 
compelling proof.”18 
The First Circuit’s rejection of this argument in favor of the preponderance of 
the evidence standard was partially inspired by a Fourth Circuit ruling.19  The 
Fourth Circuit’s decision employed statutory interpretation and a balance of 
interests test to weigh the harm an erroneous decision would have on each 
party.20  Although innovative in terms of Lanham Act jurisprudence, this 
method’s roots are found in Supreme Court precedent developed in cases outside 
the realm of intellectual property.21  By adapting this approach, the Fishman 
Transducers court relieved some of the burden on Lanham Act plaintiffs to show 
sufficient evidence of intent.22  At the same time, the court established a 
preponderance of the evidence standard that could apply to even product design 
trade dress infringement claims in future decisions.23 
This Note examines the Fishman Transducers court’s judgment in selecting 
the preponderance of the evidence standard as the burden of proof to show 
willfulness, a form of intent required to obtain an accounting of the defendant’s 
profits as a remedy.  It first discusses the history leading up to the case, including 
legislative history of the Lanham Act, Supreme Court precedent on the role of 
intent, cases that led to the use of each standard of proof in Lanham Act suits, 
and the state of First Circuit trademark law prior to this development.  This Note 
then provides a detailed explanation of the First Circuit’s opinion in Fishman 
Transducers and the circumstances that led to that case.  Finally, this Note 
analyzes the court’s sound reasoning and the impact Fishman Transducers may 
have on future decisions. 
I.  THE CENTURY-LONG PROGRESSION TO A PROPER STANDARD OF PROOF 
Congress enacted the Lanham Act to satisfy two core purposes.24  First, the 
Act was designed to protect the public from deceptive sales practices and ensure 
 18. Brief for Appellees, supra note 15, at 26 (citing Versa Prods., 50 F.3d at 207–08). 
 19. See Fishman Transducers, 684 F.3d at 193. 
 20. See id. at 193, n.7 (referencing Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 
214, 226–27 (4th Cir. 2002) and noting the split in authority on the burden of proof issue); see also 
infra Part I.C.2. 
 21. See Harrods, 203 F.3d at 225–26 (citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991)) 
(adopting the preponderance of the evidence standard because it “results in a roughly equal 
allocation of the risk of error between the litigants”); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 
253 (1989) (applying the preponderance of the evidence standard to employment discrimination 
disputes), superseded in part by statute, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g) as recognized in 
Univ. Of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013); Herman & MacLean v. 
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (prescribing the preponderance of the evidence standard in 
securities fraud cases); see also infra Part I.C.1. 
 22. See Fishman Transducers, 684 F.3d at 193; see also discussion infra Part II.C. 
 23. See Fishman Transducers, 684 F.3d at 193, n.7 (citing Versa Prods. Co., Inc. v. Bifold 
Co. (Mfg.), 50 F.3d 189, 207–08 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
 24. See S. REP. NO. 1333, at 1274 (1946). 
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that consumers could identify a product’s manufacturer by its mark so as to make 
well-informed purchases based on the maker’s reputation.25  Second, the Act 
was written to protect the investment of “energy, time, and money” that 
trademark owners make promoting their products on the market.26  Congress 
viewed the Act as “the essence of competition” and a way of “encourag[ing] the 
maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefit of the good 
reputation which excellence creates.”27 
Congress also intended the Lanham Act to serve as a means of “making 
infringement and piracy unprofitable.”28  Although Congress did not explicitly 
address any changes to existing trademark legislation with regard to a party’s 
intent to profit from infringement, the requirement of the Trademark Act of 1920 
that a party must act “willfully and with intent to deceive” to be held liable for 
“falsely identify[ing]” a product’s source is absent from the Lanham Act.29  The 
reason for this change was that requiring proof of this level of intent was difficult 
to the point of making the statute nearly impossible to enforce.30  Some of the 
most telling examples of the ambiguous role of intent in trademark and unfair 
competition cases are found in the history of awarding an accounting of the 
infringer’s profits,31 the same remedy sought by the mark owner in Fishman 
Transducers.32 
 25. Id.; see also Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) 
(noting that Congress aimed to protect national trademarks because they encourage competition 
and higher quality products). 
 26. S. REP. NO. 1333, at 1274; see also Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198. 
 27. S. REP. NO. 1333, at 1275; see also Park ‘N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198.  The report of the 79th 
Congress cited Justice Holmes’ opinion that “[a trade-mark] does not confer a right to prohibit the 
use of the word or words,” but “only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the 
owner’s good will against the sale of another’s product as his.”  S. REP. NO. 1333, at 1275 (citing 
Prestonettes v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924)); see also Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and 
the Social Function of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 175–76 (1949) (describing 
the state of free markets without trademark protection as a “sort of barbarism” where “[t]here could 
be no pride of workmanship, no credit for good quality, no responsibility for bad”). 
 28. S. REP. NO. 1333, at 1275. 
 29. See Act of March 19, 1920, ch. 104, § 3, Pub. L. No. 19-163, 41 Stat. 533, 534 (repealed 
1946).  Section 3 of the Act of March 19, 1920 was replaced by section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).  Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 648 n.7 
(1958). 
 30. Parkway Baking, 255 F.2d at 648 n.7 (stating that “the requirement of willfulness and 
intent to deceive had been stricken” in a bill introduced to Congress in the 1920’s and remained 
that way through the passage of the Lanham Act). 
 31. See infra Part I.A. 
 32. Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul, 684 F.3d 187, 190 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that the trial 
judge denied the plaintiff a “disgorgement of profits” because the jury found that the defendant 
lacked the requisite intent); see infra Part II.C. 
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A.  The Supreme Court’s Ambiguous Stance on Whether Intent Should be a 
Factor in Decisions to Grant an Accounting of Profits 
Even before Congress passed the Lanham Act, the Supreme Court had ruled 
on the issue of awarding a plaintiff an accounting of profits reaped by an 
infringer.33  In the 1916 decision Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 
the Court’s only mention of intent was in its rejection of an infringer’s request 
to limit the amount of profits recoverable by the mark’s owner.34  The Court 
noted that in addition to “such an apportionment [being] inherently impossible,” 
Hamilton-Brown was not “an innocent infringer.”35  However, the Court’s 
holding that Hamilton-Brown owed an accounting was based not on the presence 
of intent, but on the theory that trademarks are property to be enjoyed 
exclusively by their owners.36  Therefore, although the court considered intent 
in determining the extent of the award, intent was not a factor in the decision 
on whether to grant such a remedy.37 
Decades later, the Court heard Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, in which 
an injunction had previously been granted against the infringing party.38  
Because there was no showing of intent, the Court held that the injunction alone, 
 33. See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 206–07 
(1942); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 259–60 (1916).  Congress 
passed the Lanham Act in 1946.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1114n (2006 & 2012). 
 34. See Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 240 U.S. at 260–61 (describing Hamilton-Brown’s 
contention that there should be “an apportionment between the profits attributable to defendant’s 
use of the offending mark and those attributable to the intrinsic merit of defendant’s shoes”).  
Hamilton-Brown had placed the phrase “American Lady” on its women’s shoes, despite the fact 
that fellow shoemaker Wolf Brothers owned the similar trademark “The American Girl.”  Id. at 
253, 256 (holding that Wolf Brothers’ trademark “The American Girl” was not merely “a 
geographical or descriptive term,” but “a fanciful designation” entitled to protection). 
 35. See id. at 261 (stating that evidence indicated fraudulent conduct and “persistence in the 
unlawful simulation”). 
 36. See id. at 259, 262 (adding that American courts normally award both damages and any 
profits gained from the infringement). 
 37. See id. at 259–62; see also Conway-Jones, supra note 8, at 875 (asserting that the Court 
did not require the plaintiff to prove the defendant acted in bad faith but merely discussed intent to 
bolster its decision); Luciani, supra note 8, at 77 (stating that the Court only “mentioned” intent, 
and that its decision did not rely on this observation); Mark A. Thurmon, Confusion Codified: Why 
Trademark Remedies Make No Sense, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 245, 286 (2010) (describing the 
court’s analysis as stating that, without a showing of intentional infringement, the plaintiff’s award 
of the infringer’s profits could be reduced). 
 38. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 131 (1947) (citing Mishawaka 
Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203 (1942)) (stating that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Mishawaka Rubber did not hold that an infringement necessarily means that 
the plaintiff is entitled to an accounting).  Prior to Champion Spark Plug, the Court heard 
Mishawaka Rubber, another shoe-related case in which, without reference to intent, the Court 
reaffirmed that profits acquired due to infringement must be paid to the trademark’s owner. 
Mishawaka Rubber, 316 U.S. at 207 (citing Hamilton-Brown, 240 U.S. 251).  However, the 
Mishawaka Rubber Court’s holding only applied to “the measure of profits and damages for the 
infringement found,” not whether the type of remedy was appropriate to give.  Id. at 204–05. 
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without an accounting, would “satisfy the equities.”39  However, legal 
commentators disagree as to whether this suggests that an existing injunction is 
cause for denying profits, or whether it more broadly implies that proof of intent 
is necessary to automatically grant an accounting of profits.40  Despite this 
ambiguity, courts today tend to examine intent “as a gloss or screen in deciding 
what remedies to provide” once infringement has been established—even when 
it is not required by the relevant provisions of the Act.41 
B.  The Procompetitive Policy Foundations of the Third Circuit’s Clear and 
Convincing Evidence Standard 
1.  The Limiting Effect of Sears and Compco on State Unfair Competition 
Laws 
To arrive at the heightened standard of proof, the Third Circuit applied a 
policy in Versa Products Co., Inc. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.) Ltd. that was developed 
nearly half a century ago through two Supreme Court decisions addressing the 
potential for conflict between unfair competition laws and federal patent 
legislation.42  In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., the Court examined whether 
a state’s unfair competition law could prevent an unpatented product from being 
replicated.43  In addition to its claim that Sears infringed the mechanical and 
design patents of a lamp, Stiffel alleged that Illinois’s unfair competition law 
prohibited Sears from selling a “substantially identical,” lower-priced lamp 
without manufacturer identification.44  The appellate court found Stiffel’s 
patents “invalid for want of invention,”45 but held that the “copying and 
 39. Champion Spark Plug, 311 U.S. at 131–32 (noting that the respondents made efforts to 
comply with a prior order to label the spark plugs as used products).  The respondent company was 
barred from reselling used spark plugs bearing the name “Champion” without first clearly labeling 
them as second-hand products.  Id. at 126–27; see also id. at 130 (stating that any financial benefit 
to “the second-hand dealer . . . is wholly permissible so long as the [original] manufacturer is not 
identified with the inferior qualities of the [reconditioned] product”). 
 40. See Luciani, supra note 8, at 78 (quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 30:61, at 30,  
165–66) (noting that some scholars disagree with the notion that “an accounting of the infringer’s 
profits is not automatically granted upon a showing of infringement”). 
 41. See Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul, 684 F.3d 187, 191 (1st Cir. 2012); infra Part II.C. 
 42. See Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.), 50 F.3d 189, 204 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 
376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964)).  Further, Congress has stated “[t]here is no essential difference between 
trade-mark infringement and . . . unfair competition.”  S. REP. NO. 1333, at 1275 (1946); see also 
infra Part I.B.3. 
 43. Sears, 376 U.S. at 225. 
 44. Sears, 376 U.S. at 225–26 (explaining that pole lamps sold by Sears were “substantially 
identical” to the ones Stiffel originally brought to market at a higher retail price, and that the 
evidence showed a likelihood of confusion among consumers as to the actual manufacturer’s 
identity). 
 45. Id. at 226; see also id. at 227 n.1 (stating that Stiffel did not seek review when the appellate 
court upheld the district court’s finding that a patent was invalid). 
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marketing” of its design constituted unfair competition.46  The Supreme Court 
reversed, reasoning that, because states do not have power to extend federal 
patents, Illinois’s ban on copying “clashe[d] with the objectives of the federal 
patent laws.”47 
On the same day as it decided Sears, the Court also decided Compco Corp. v. 
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., which involved the copying of an unpatented industrial 
design.48  Day-Brite claimed that Compco infringed its design patent for a 
lighting fixture and violated Illinois’s unfair competition law by selling “very 
similar” products capable of confusing consumers.49  The appellate court held 
that, although the design patent was invalid, Compco had unfairly competed 
under state law.50  Consistent with Sears, the Supreme Court held that a state’s 
unfair competition laws cannot prohibit such copying, even if it results in 
consumer confusion as to origin.51  The Court further declared that if a “design 
is not entitled to a design patent or other federal statutory protection, then it can 
be copied at will.”52 
2.  Circuit Courts React to the Sears-Compco Doctrine 
In the wake of Sears and Compco, defendants began arguing that the doctrine 
favoring the public’s right to copy unpatented products should also apply to 
product designs protected as trade dress by the Lanham Act.53  Circuit courts, 
 46. Id. at 227 (opining that the appellate court was “[i]mpressed by the ‘remarkable sameness 
of appearance’ of the lamps”. 
 47. Id. at 230–31 (explaining how, upon the expiration of a patent, “the right to make the 
article . . . passes to the public”). 
 48. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (citing Sears, 376 U.S. 
225) (beginning the opinion with a reference to Sears). 
 49. Id. at 234–35 (noting that the predecessor of Compco began manufacturing fluorescent 
light fixtures that implemented a reflector design similar to Day-Brite’s, after Day-Brite already 
entered the market with its own fixtures). 
 50. Id. at 235, 236 n.2 (stating that Day-Brite did not seek review of the validity of its patent). 
 51. Id. at 237. 
 52. Id. at 238 (noting that states may still “require[] those who make and sell copies to take 
precautions to identify their products as their own”). 
 53. See, e.g., Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 636 (7th Cir. 1993) (highlighting 
defendant’s arguments that Moen may not register for trademark protection of its nonfunctional 
faucet shapes due to conflict with patent law and the anticompetitive nature of such protection); 
Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1239 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating defendant’s 
assertion that the nonfunctional external design features of Ferrari’s automobiles may only be 
protected under patent law, not the Lanham Act); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat 
Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1979) (explaining defendant’s theory that it was entitled 
to use the nonfunctional design aspects of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders’ uniforms in its adult 
film); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1214 (8th Cir. 1976) (describing 
defendant’s argument that it was allowed to copy plaintiff’s external design for a hopper grain 
trailer, even though that design was nonfunctional and acquired secondary meaning among 
consumers). 
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however, thought otherwise.54  In Truck Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf 
Corp., the Eighth Circuit declared that federal trademarks legislation was not an 
issue in Sears or Compco, and that the actual focus of both cases was 
“whether state law could extend the effective term of patent protection granted 
by the federal statutes.”55  The court further illustrated how both trademark and 
patent law can operate concurrently and independently from one another while 
promoting free competition.56 
In Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., the Seventh Circuit demonstrated that, unlike the 
state laws in Sears and Compco, “[t]he Lanham Act was drafted in reaction to 
draconian state trademark legislation that threatened to interfere with interstate 
commerce.”57  The court affirmed that there is “no unavoidable conflict between 
the patent law and federal trademark law as applied to product configurations.”58  
In using the phrase “no unavoidable conflict,”59 the court alluded to the marginal 
possibility of conflict between patent law and the Lanham Act, which could be 
avoided through “a careful application of traditional bases for determining the 
propriety of trademark protection.”60  The Third Circuit examined one of these 
traditional methods, the “likelihood of confusion” test, at length in a case that 
featured a special focus on the proper standard of proof to show intent.61 
 54. See, e.g., Kohler, 12 F.3d at 640 (relying on the history of circuit courts holding “that 
Sears and Compco do not preclude federal trademark protection of designs”); Esercizio, 944 F.2d 
at 1241 (“Because trademark law and patent law address different concerns, and because of the 
narrow focus of the Supreme Court’s inquiry in Compco and Sears, courts have explicitly held that 
these decisions do not preclude Lanham Act protection of designs.”); Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 204 (declaring that “Sears-Compco did not redefine the permissible 
scope of the law of trademarks”); Truck Equip. Serv., 536 F.2d at 1215 (distinguishing Sears and 
Compco from the case before the court due to the absence of a clash between state laws and federal 
statutes). 
 55. Truck Equip. Serv., 536 F.2d at 1214 (emphasis added). 
 56. Id. at 1215.  The court explained that trademark law “protects commercial activity which, 
in our society, is essentially private,” while patent law “protects inventive activity” for a term before 
it becomes part of the public domain.  Id. 
 57. Kohler, 12 F.3d at 640 n.10. 
 58. Id. at 644.  The Kohler court also referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Bonito 
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. to support its point.  See id. (citing 489 U.S. 141 (1989)).  
In Bonito Boats, the Court noted that, through the Lanham Act, “Congress has thus given federal 
recognition to many of the concerns that underlie the state tort of unfair competition, and the 
application of Sears and Compco to nonfunctional aspects of a product which have been shown to 
identify source must take account of competing federal policies in this regard.”  Bonito Boats, 489 
U.S. at 166. 
 59. See Kohler, 12 F.3d at 644 (emphasis added). 
 60. See id. at 642 (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774–75 (1992)). 
 61. See infra Section I.B.3. 
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3.  The Third Circuit Applies the Sears-Compco Doctrine to Resolve the 
Standard of Proof for Intent 
Notwithstanding the consensus against applying Sears and Compco to 
Lanham Act violations,62 the Third Circuit in Versa Products Co., Inc. v. Bifold 
Co. (Mfg.) relied on both cases in a “product configuration” trade dress 
infringement suit.63  Versa filed a complaint under section 43(a) of the Act, 
claiming that Bifold copied the design of its control valve.64  Section 43(a) does 
not require prior registration, but operates as soon as a trademark or trade dress 
is used in commerce.65  In order to be protected under this section, trade dress 
must be 1) distinctive, 2) nonfunctional, and 3) there must be sufficient proof of 
a likelihood of consumer confusion.66  Reasoning that consumers seldom rely 
on product designs to identify a source, the Third Circuit stated that courts 
should not automatically infer intent to confuse when a product’s design is 
copied.67 
 62. See supra Section I.B.2. 
 63. See Versa Prods. Co., Inc. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.), 50 F.3d 189, 204 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964)) (declaring that “legal recognition of consumer reliance 
on product configurations as source indicators” is constrained by federal patent laws).  The terms 
“product design” and “product configuration” may be used interchangeably.  See Abercrombie & 
Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 630 n.4 (6th Cir. 2002) (describing 
product configuration as a “vogue term” for product design); DINWOODIE & JANIS, TRADE DRESS 
AND DESIGN LAW 41 (2010) (stating that a product’s shape may be referred to as its configuration 
or its design, but that the term “product design” is used “perhaps too loosely”).  This Note uses the 
term “product design.” 
 64. Versa Prods., 50 F.3d at 193; see id. at 194 (describing the cast version of Versa’s B-316 
control valve, which functioned the same way as its stainless steel valve, as having a “Versa look” 
similar to its original product line first produced in 1949); id. at 195 (stating Bifold launched a cast 
version of its own Domino Junior valve in 1991, eight years after Versa’s was already placed on 
the market, but claimed that it was merely a smaller version of its prior released Domino valve). 
 65. 15 U.S.C. 1125(a) (2006); see DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 63, at 18 (stating 
trademark owners seeking enforcement under section 43(a) are not granted “various procedural 
advantages available to registrants,” but are entitled to “a federal action for unfair competition”). 
 66. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992).  In Two Pesos, the 
Supreme Court upheld a ruling that a Mexican restaurant’s decor was inherently distinctive and 
therefore customers would be able to distinguish it from a competitor’s décor.  Id. at 773.  The 
Court also acknowledged the Fifth Circuit’s definition of a “legally functional” design, or a design 
that is “one of a limited number of equally efficient options available to competitors,” reasoning 
that excluding functional designs from Lanham Act protection “assure[s] that competition will not 
be stifled by the exhaustion of a limited number of trade dresses.”  Id. at 775 (citing Sicilia Di R. 
Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 426 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
 67. See Versa Prods., 50 F.3d at 206–07 (distinguishing between the relevance of an 
infringer’s intent in cases dealing with a product’s mark or packaging and in cases concerning a 
product’s design).  The court reasoned that, when a mark or packaging is copied, there may be an 
inference of an intent to confuse because “there is little or no competitive need to copy another’s 
distinctive symbol or presentation to sell one’s product, and that anyone who does so is most likely 
trying to cash in on the competitor’s goodwill.”  Id.  Conversely, the court reasoned, “the mere 
copying of product configurations does not suggest that the copier was necessarily trying to 
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The court also examined the standard of proof needed to show intent in patent 
cases, noting the protection of product configurations imposed “patent-like 
restrictions on competition.”68  Despite previously noting that federal patent law 
does not prohibit the protection of trade dress under Section 43(a),69 the court 
noted the Compco Court’s policy of “‘allowing free access to copy whatever the 
federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain.’”70  The court 
therefore held that competitors should not be punished by higher damage 
awards, and free competition should not be impaired by restrictive penalties 
without clear and convincing evidence of intent.71  Applying the heightened 
standard, the court concluded that Versa failed to prove that Bifold caused a 
likelihood of confusion.72 
4.  The Supreme Court’s Post-Versa Products Limitation on Lanham Act 
Protection of Product Design 
Versa Products altered the requirements of the likelihood of confusion test, 
including the level of proof needed to show intent to confuse.  The court based 
this change on the premise that Lanham Act protection of product design poses 
a unique risk to free markets through the creation of “patent-like restrictions on 
competition.”73  But the Supreme Court did not address whether a special test of 
capitalize on the good will of the source of the original product.”  Id. at 201.  The court also stated 
that, because the public is “less likely[] to rely on a product configuration as an indicator of the 
product’s source . . . they are less likely to be confused as to the sources of two products with 
substantially similar configurations.”  Id. at 202–03. 
 68. Id. at 207 (citing Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 822 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (holding that intent to commit inequitable conduct by deceiving the Patent Office and willful 
infringement of a patent each require a heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence); 
Allen Organ Co. v. Kimball Intern., Inc., 839 F.2d 1556, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that intent 
to commit inequitable conduct by misleading the Patent Office requires a showing of clear and 
convincing evidence); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 
1440 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that willful infringement of a patent requires proof by clear and 
convincing evidence)). 
 69. Id. at 204 n.12 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 225 (1964); 
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964)). 
 70. Id. at 207–08 (citing Compco, 376 U.S. at 237) (reasoning that “a heightened evidentiary 
standard would serve to ensure that deviations from ‘the federal policy’” acknowledged in Compco 
“are not casually countenanced”). 
 71. Id. at 207–08. 
 72. Id. at 216.  In reaching its conclusion, the court also offered a detailed examination of 
other factors that contribute to a likelihood of confusion, including similar appearance, the strength 
of the owner’s mark, the attention expected of consumers, evidence of actual confusion, and various 
aspects of product marketing.  Id. at 202–08. 
 73. Id. at 207.  However, an Eleventh Circuit district court subsequently rejected the Third 
Circuit’s Versa Products theory.  See Kohler Co. v. Titon Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A. 1:97CV428 RWS, 
1999 WL 1043221, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 26, 1999) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that a stricter 
test of infringement is necessary for product design).  With regard to the test of distinctiveness, the 
Courts of Appeals for both the Fourth and Eighth Circuits have held that, pursuant to the Supreme 
Court’s Two Pesos ruling, courts should judge the distinctiveness of product designs under the same 
test as all other trademarks and trade dress.  See Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 787 
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Lanham Act protection should apply to product design cases until 2000.74  
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., the Court affirmed the view 
shared by many circuits that trade dress embraces not only product packaging, 
but design as well.75  Despite the Court’s acceptance of this notion, it held that 
because a product’s design rarely enables consumers to inherently identify its 
source, the owner must show that the design has acquired a “secondary 
meaning”76 among consumers in order to pass the test of distinctiveness.77  
Echoing the procompetitive policy espoused in Sears and Compco, the Court 
suggested that, without this adjustment, the threat of litigation might hamper 
new businesses, which would ultimately harm consumers by limiting 
competition.78  This ruling also established “the only trade-dress-law difference” 
between product design and other elements that the Lanham Act protects.79 
(8th Cir. 1995) (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992)); Ashley 
Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Sangiacomo N.A. Ltd., 187 F.3d 363, 371 (4th Cir. 1999).  In Two Pesos, 
the Court held that “inherently distinctive trade dress [is] entitled to protection,” and acknowledged 
that trade dress may include “the features of a product design.”  Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 770, 772. 
 74. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000) (holding that 
trade dress protection of product design requires a showing of acquired secondary meaning to pass 
the test of distinctiveness). 
 75. Id. at 209 (acknowledging that trade dress, whether in the form of packaging or product 
design, still “constitutes a ‘symbol’ or ‘device’” and is therefore eligible for registration and 
protection under the Lanham Act). 
 76. The Court defined a product design’s secondary meaning as its “acquired, source-
identifying meaning” of a word or non-word mark, noting that “[c]larity might well be served by 
using the term ‘acquired meaning’” instead.  Id. at 211 n*8; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 (1995) (defining “secondary meaning” as “acquired distinctiveness” 
that develops from the use of a “word, name, symbol, device, or other designation” in a way that 
leads consumers “to perceive it as a designation that identifies goods, services, businesses, or 
members”). 
 77. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 212–14.  The Court used the example of a penguin-shaped cocktail 
shaker to illustrate that even highly uncommon product designs, although they may improve the 
use of appearance of the product, still lack the inherent ability to serve as a marker of the product’s 
source.  Id. At 213.  The Court further declared that the Two Pesos Court’s holding that “trade dress 
can be inherently distinctive” was inapplicable to the case at hand because Two Pesos only dealt 
with restaurant décor, a form of trade dress that resembles product packaging more than design.  Id. 
At 215 (citing Two Pesos, 529 U.S. at 773). 
 78. Id. At 213.  The Court mentioned patent law in passing, stating that, on the rare occasion 
Lanham Act protection is sought “for a design that is inherently source identifying,” a lack of 
secondary meaning would not prevent its producer from “securing a design patent or a copyright.”  
Id. At 214. 
 79. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 633 n.10 
(6th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). 
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C.  The Fourth Circuit Promotes a Balance of Interests through the 
Preponderance of the Evidence Standard 
1.  The Supreme Court’s Preferred Standard of Proof for Showing Intent to 
Defraud in Civil Suits 
While the Third Circuit’s heightened standard requirement stemmed from a 
mix of intellectual property cases,80 the Fourth Circuit established the 
preponderance of the evidence standard by relying on a series of Supreme Court 
rulings on civil litigation generally.81  The first of these rulings is Herman & 
MacLean v. Huddleston, in which the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s call for 
clear and convincing proof to show fraud in a case governed by the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.82  The Court reasoned that the common law origins of 
the heightened standard have little bearing on “modern lawsuits;”83 therefore, a 
heightened standard should only apply in civil cases “where particularly 
important individual interests or rights are at stake.”84  After examining the 
relevant provisions of the 1934 Act,85 the Court declared that: “Where Congress 
has not prescribed the appropriate standard of proof . . . we must prescribe 
one.”86  The Court further explained that the preponderance standard works best 
where the interests of both parties are balanced, reasoning that Herman & 
MacLean’s interest in avoiding the disgrace of a guilty verdict was in 
equilibrium with Huddleston’s interest as a defrauded investor.87  In a final 
rebuff of the Fifth Circuit’s rationale that proving “scienter” requires clear and 
 80. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 81. See Harrods Ltd. V. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 225–26 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 
253 (1989) superceded in part by statute, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g) as recognized in 
Univ. Of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013); Herman & MacLean v. 
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983)); see also infra Part I.C.2. 
 82. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 377–80 (explaining that securities purchaser Huddleston 
claimed that Herman & MacLean, an accounting firm that participated in an offering of the 
securities, engaged in fraudulent behavior related to a securities transaction.  The Court described 
the Fifth Circuit’s use of the clear and convincing evidence standard as “unprecedented” in 
comparison to other courts.  See id. at 379 n.7. 
 83. Id. at 388 & n.27. 
 84. Id. at 389–90 (stating that if severe civil sanctions do not involve significant rights, they 
do not warrant a clear and convincing standard).  The Court cited examples of interests that would 
require a higher standard, including parental rights, involuntary commitment, and deportation.  Id. 
at 389. 
 85. See id. at 380–87 (concluding after a lengthy statutory analysis that Congress granted 
“defrauded purchasers of registered securities” the right to an action). 
 86. Id. at 389. 
 87. Id. at 390 (declaring that, although Herman & MacLean faced potential harsh criticism if 
convicted of fraudulent conduct, Huddleston’s status as a “[d]efrauded investor[]” included him in 
the class of people Congress enacted securities laws to protect). 
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convincing evidence, the Court noted that, “[i]f anything, the difficulty of 
proving the defendant’s state of mind supports a lower standard.”88 
The Court revisited the issue of intent in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a case 
that centered on an employer’s burden of proving that its motives were not 
discriminatory.89  The Court engaged in a “common sense” analysis of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to determine what Congress intended an 
employer to prove to escape liability.90  Citing Herman & MacLean, the Court 
held that an employer partially motivated by gender stereotypes must show by a 
preponderance that even without the gender discrimination, the employer would 
not have acted differently.91  The Court acknowledged that exceptions to the 
lower standard may arise “when the government seeks to take unusual coercive 
action,” but not in a suit for ordinary forms of relief.92 
The final installment in this trio of pro-preponderance rulings was Grogan v. 
Garner, in which the Court deliberated on the standard of proof for a creditor to 
show that he was defrauded by an individual seeking bankruptcy protection.93  
The Court reasoned that because the relevant Bankruptcy Code provision was 
silent on the matter, Congress could not have intended to require clear and 
convincing evidence.94  Although most states used a heightened standard of 
proof in fraud cases at the time of the Code’s enactment, the Court dismissed 
this as irrelevant to congressional intent.95  Instead, the Court declared that the 
preponderance standard is best implemented in cases where no “particularly 
important individual interests or rights are at stake,” and that adopting it in such 
cases would have the favorable result of “a roughly equal allocation of the risk 
of error.”96  The Court further stated that a bankrupt defendant’s interest in 
 88. Id. at 390 n.30 (emphasis added) (rebutting the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning that, because “the 
proof of scienter required in fraud cases is often a matter of inference from circumstantial 
evidence,” there should be a higher standard of proof required). 
 89. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231–32 (1989), superseded in part by statute, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g) as recognized in Univ. Of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 
133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (stating that Hopkins filed a suit alleging sex discrimination under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 after she failed to obtain admission as a partner at Price 
Waterhouse). 
 90. See id. at 241–42. 
 91. Id. at 252–53 (citing Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 390) (observing that 
“[c]onventional rules of civil litigation generally apply in Title VII cases,” and such rules are 
governed by Herman & MacLean). 
 92. Id. at 253 (describing the types of consequences that would justify a heightened standard 
as being “more dramatic than entering an award of money damages”). 
 93. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 280–83 (1991) (describing Grogan’s claim of a 
fraudulent corporate securities transaction and Garner’s argument that Section 523(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code requires fraud to be proved by clear and convincing evidence). 
 94. Id. at 286 (“This silence is inconsistent with the view that Congress intended to require a 
special, heightened standard of proof.”) 
 95. Id. at 288 (reaffirming that “Congress has chosen the preponderance standard when it has 
created substantive causes of action for fraud”) 
 96. Id. at 286 (quoting Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 389–90). 
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obtaining a “fresh start” does not outweigh a creditor’s interest in recovering 
from a fraudulent act.97 
2.  The Fourth Circuit Carries Herman & MacLean, Price Waterhouse, 
and Grogan into Lanham Act Territory 
In Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, the Fourth Circuit became 
the first court to rule on the standard of proof required to show bad faith under 
section 43(d)(1) of the Lanham Act,98 as amended in 1999 by the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA).99  Section 43(d)(1) 
creates liability when a person with “a bad faith intent to profit from [a] mark . . 
. registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name” in a way that violates the 
ACPA.100  The plaintiff, Harrods UK, claimed that its former affiliate, Harrods 
Buenos Aires, registered sixty domain names containing the name “Harrods” in 
bad faith.101  The court affirmed the application of the preponderance of the 
evidence standard and noted that no cases interpreting the ACPA had ever 
mentioned the clear and convincing evidence standard.102  The court then 
reasoned that “[t]he interests implicated by the . . . ACPA are important, but they 
are not in the same category as those listed in Herman,” which related to 
“parental rights, involuntary commitment . . . and deportation.”103  The court 
acknowledged other Lanham Act cases in which judges demanded a heightened 
standard for proving fraud or bad faith, but dismissed these holdings because 
 97. Id. at 286–87 (stating that “requiring the creditor to establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that his claim is not dischargeable reflects a fair balance between these conflicting 
interests”). 
 98. Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 225 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 99. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-545 
(1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006)).  The ACPA allows plaintiffs to bring in rem actions 
against domain names when personal jurisdiction cannot otherwise be obtained.  Harrods, 302 F.3d 
at 222–23. 
 100. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i)-(ii); Harrods, 302 F.3d at 223; see also MCCARTHY, supra 
note 6, § 25:78 (explaining that the “bad faith intent to profit” required by the statute may be related 
to the web advertising sales by diverting web traffic searching for the trademark owner’s site, but 
not to the sale of domain names to a trademark owner). 
 101. Harrods, 302 F.3d at 219–20.  Harrods UK opened its first department store in London in 
1849 and created its South American subsidiary in 1912, which later established Harrods Buenos 
Aires as an independent company.  Id. at 220.  By 1963, Harrods UK and Harrods Buenos Aires 
had completely severed ties.  See id.  The domain name controversy did not begin until 1999, when 
Harrods Buenos Aires registered hundreds of “Harrods-related domain names” with Network 
Solutions, Inc. in Herndon, Virginia.  Id. at 221–22. 
 102. Id. at 225–26 (explaining that the absence of a discussion on the clear and convincing 
evidence standard in bad faith cases under ACPA indicates that courts have assumed the usual 
preponderance of the evidence standard applies). 
 103. Id. at 226 (citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991); Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989), superseded in part by statute, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-
5(g) as recognized in Univ. Of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013); Herman & 
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983)). 
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they were not required under the Lanham Act.104  Citing Grogan, the court 
further declared that the absence of indicative language in the ACPA’s text and 
legislative history goes against the view that Congress intended to make it more 
difficult to prove bad faith intent.105 
D.  The First Circuit Landscape Pre-Fishman Transducers, Inc. 
First Circuit jurisprudence contains a unique exception to the rule that courts 
must always consider intent as a factor in determining whether an accounting of 
profits is warranted.106  In Aktiebolaget Electrolux v. Armatron Intern., Inc., the 
First Circuit declared that “a plaintiff seeking an accounting of defendant’s 
profits must [only] show that the products directly compete, such that 
defendant’s profits would have gone to plaintiff if there was no violation.”107  
This rule was reexamined in Tamko Roofing Products, Inc. v. Ideal Roofing Co., 
Ltd.108  The court addressed whether Tamko was entitled to an accounting after 
 104. Id. at 226–27.  The court acknowledged Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc. v. Pinehurst Nat’l 
Corp., which held that clear and convincing evidence is required to show intent to deceive the 
Patent and Trademark Office.  148 F.3d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 1998).  The court also noted the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., which held that the intent required to 
demonstrate that a case is of an exceptional nature, and thus receive an award of attorneys’ fees, 
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.  155 F.3d 526, 555 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 105. Id. at 227 (citing Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286) (comparing the silence of the relevant statute 
in Grogan to that of the ACPA on the issue of the appropriate standard of proof).  The Harrods 
court reasoned that because Congress thoroughly delineated the bad faith factors in the language of 
section 43(d) of the Lanham Act as well as in the legislative history, Congress would have done 
the same for the ACPA if it had intended to impose a heightened burden of proof in that statute.  
See id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (2006); S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 13–16 (1999); H.R. 
REP. NO. 106-412, at 10–13 (1999)). 
 106. See MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 30:62 (stating that courts ordinarily require a showing 
of intent “to infringe or reap the harvest of another’s mark” in order for a plaintiff to obtain an 
accounting of the defendant’s profits); Conway-Jones, supra note 8, at 927 (showing that six 
circuits recognize intent as a prerequisite to an award of the defendant’s profits, and six others 
consider intent as a factor in determining the appropriate remedy); Luciani, supra note 8, at 69 
(noting that even though there is a circuit split, most courts agree that bad faith must be found 
before awarding the plaintiff an accounting of the profits).  The First Circuit’s exception to the 
general rule is explained in Aktiebolaget Electrolux v. Armatron Int’l., Inc., which affirms that, to 
obtain an accounting of the defendant’s profits absent a showing of intent, the plaintiff must show 
direct competition between the products.  999 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 107. Id. (adding that this requirement is not applied as stringently if there was fraud on the 
defendant’s part).  AB Electrolux had a registered trademark for “Weed Eater” gardening tools, 
which Armatron discovered while conducting research to trademark its own “Leaf Eater” product.  
Id. at 2–3.  Armatron claimed the name “Leaf Eater” was inspired by its insect control device called 
the “Skeeter Eater.”  Id.  The court stated there was little likelihood of confusion caused by the 
infringement, reasoning that, even though the products shared “similar channels of trade, 
advertising and class of prospective purchasers,” each was intended for a different type of gardening 
use.  Id. at 4.  The court held that, because the products did not directly compete and Armatron did 
not act in bad faith, there could be no accounting of profits.  Id. at 6. 
 108. Tamko Roofing Prods., Inc. v. Ideal Roofing Co., Ltd., 282 F.3d 23, 27–28 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(explaining that Ideal developed a “Heritage Series” mark resembling Tamko’s “The American 
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Tamko was granted an injunction.109  However, the court held that, despite the 
injunction, the fact that the parties’ roofing products directly competed with each 
other warranted an accounting, regardless of whether the infringer acted 
fraudulently or in bad faith.110 
Tamko Roofing also provided the defendants-appellees in Fishman 
Transducers with some ammunition for their argument in favor of a heightened 
standard of proof.111  In Tamko Roofing, the First Circuit noted that the district 
court used the clear and convincing evidence standard to show willful 
infringement.112  The First Circuit in Fishman Transducers later addressed 
whether this language affirmed that the heightened standard is required, but 
ultimately ruled that it was merely dicta.113 
II.  THE FIRST CIRCUIT OPTS FOR A MODERN APPROACH 
A.  The Marketing Mix-Up that Lead to First Circuit Precedent 
Fishman Transducers, Inc. developed a line of “highly regarded” pickups, 
which amplify the sound of a guitar.114  Fishman served guitar manufacturers as 
a supplier, but did not sell guitars to consumers directly.115  Stephen Paul, better 
known by his stage name, Esteban, is a guitarist who began working with the 
Home Shopping Network (HSN) in 2001 through his company, Daystar 
Productions, to promote his line of Esteban guitars and accessories.116  In 2006, 
Force Limited, Paul’s manufacturer, decided to change the pickup in the 
Heritage Series” mark, and later violated the district court’s preliminary injunction by its continued 
use of the mark online and in brochures distributed at trade shows). 
 109. Tamko Roofing, 282 F.3d at 35–36 (citing Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 
125, 131 (1947)) (referring to Champion Spark Plug to declare that “injunctive relief may be 
adequate if there has been no fraud”). 
 110. Tamko Roofing, 282 F.3d at 36.  The First Circuit noted the AB Electrolux court’s 
“silen[ce] on whether ‘willfulness’ is a precondition for an accounting,” but also noted that it did 
not need to address that question because the jury in Tamko Roofing already found that the 
infringement was “done voluntarily and intentionally.”  Id. at 36 & n.10 (citing AB Electrolux, 999 
F.2d at 5–6). 
 111. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 15, at 18–19 (citing Tamko Roofing, 282 F.3d at 29) 
(arguing that the “serious charge” of willful infringement must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence so that the monetary harm borne by the defendant does not outweigh the goal 
of deterrence). 
 112. Tamko Roofing, 282 F.3d at 29 (quoting the district court jury’s finding by clear and 
convincing evidence that Ideal willfully infringed Tamko’s trademark). 
 113. See Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul, 684 F.3d 187 (1st Cir. 2012); see also infra Part 
II.C. 
 114. Fishman Transducers, 684 F.3d at 189 (explaining that the term “transducer” refers to a 
device usually included in a guitar pickup and hidden inside a guitar). 
 115. Id. at 194. 
 116. Id. at 189 (describing the product packages sold as “a guitar equipped with a pickup as 
well as accessories such as a strap, case, amplifier and instructional videos”). 
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guitars.117  Belcat, which provided pickups to Force, described the new pickups 
as either Fishman or “Fishman-type.”118  Like a classic game of telephone, Force 
informed HSN that the guitars now included Fishman pickups, and HSN, in turn, 
told Paul the same.119 
In October 2006, during his appearances on the HSN channel, Paul began 
advertising that Esteban guitars were made with Fishman pickups.120  Claiming 
that he personally selected them for his guitars, he praised the pickups as being 
“top of the line,”121 and even bragged that one of these pickups by itself would 
cost as much as an Esteban guitar with accessories does.122  After months of 
these on-air promotions, Fishman demanded that HSN cease advertising its 
pickups.123  Although HSN immediately complied, Fishman filed suit against 
HSN, Paul, and Daystar.124 
B.  Esteban and Company Perform for the District Court 
Fishman’s main claims against the defendants were trademark infringement 
and false advertising, both governed by section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.125  
Because Esteban and HSN did not vigorously object to those charges, a 
significant portion of the oral arguments and trial testimony dealt with the issue 
of the defendants’ intent.126  The jury, acting under the judge’s instruction that 
clear and convincing evidence is required to prove willfulness, found that the 
violations were not willful.127 
In a post-trial order, Judge O’Toole reiterated that an award of profits based 
on the First Circuit’s direct competition rule was not warranted in this case, 
because Esteban’s guitars did not directly compete with Fishman’s pickups.128  
 117. Id. at 190 (stating that Force manufactured the guitars for HSN in China with pickups 
made by a company named Belcat). 
 118. Id.; see also id. at n.1 (explaining that Fishman contracted with Belcat, allowing it to use 
“Fishman-patented” technology, but forbidding it from using the Fishman name in promotions). 
 119. Id. at 190. 
 120. Id. at 189.  HSN had already been listing Fishman pickups in the guitar specifications on 
its website.  Id. 
 121. Id. at 194 (stating that Paul’s on-air statements were put “in terms exceeding anything 
represented by Force Limited”). 
 122. Id. at 189. 
 123. Id. (explaining that Fishman did not reach out to HSN and Daystar to demand an end to 
the use of its name in promotions until “[s]everal months after the television advertising began”). 
 124. Id. at 189–90. 
 125. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012); Fishman Transducers, 684 F.3d at 189–90. 
 126. Fishman Transducers, 684 F.3d at 190 (mentioning that the trial lasted for a period of 
eight days). 
 127. Id. at 190. 
 128. Memorandum and Order Regarding Equitable Relief at 1, 3, Fishman Transducers, Inc. 
v. Paul, No. 07-10071-GAO (D. Mass. Mar. 29, 2011) (citing Aktiebolaget Electrolux v. Armatron 
Int’l., Inc., 999 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1993)); see also Fishman Transducers,  684 F.3d at 196 
(explaining that a pickup is one “ingredient” of a guitar, rather than a market substitute). 
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In a subsequent order, the judge denied Fishman’s renewed motion for judgment 
as a matter of law based on the jury instructions, citing the Tamko Roofing 
court’s acknowledgement of the clear and convincing standard for proving 
willfulness.129 
On appeal, Fishman contended that the First Circuit did not require a showing 
of willfulness by clear and convincing evidence in Tamko because the issue was 
not before the court.130  In response, defendants-appellees Paul, HSN, and Force 
claimed that the First Circuit’s dictum in Tamko Roofing still supports the 
argument for a higher standard.131  Additionally, the defendants-appellees 
cited Versa Products in support of adopting the Third Circuit’s clear and 
convincing proof requirement to ensure that higher damages were not imposed 
without convincing evidence.132 
C.  Judge Boudin’s Fine-Tuned Opinion on the Proper Standard 
Fishman’s appeal of the district court’s decision was based primarily on the 
issue of intent.133  Circuit Judge Boudin began with a brief analysis of section 
35 of the Lanham Act, which governs the basic requirements for awarding 
certain remedies, including an accounting of profits.134  Noting the absence of 
the word “willful” from the relevant provision, the court pointed out that the 
 129. Order at 3–4, Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul, No. 07-10071-GAO (D. Mass. May 18, 
2011) (citing Tamko Roofing, 282 F.3d at 29) (finding no evidence that the First Circuit ever 
questioned whether the heightened burden was proper); see also supra note 115 and accompanying 
text. 
 130. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Fishman Transducers, Inc. at 29, Fishman Transducers 684 
F.3d 187  (No. 11-1663) (citing Tamko Roofing, 282 F.3d at 29).  Fishman also highlighted the 
Tamko Roofing court’s analysis of legislative history to establish that “[w]illfulness short of bad 
faith or fraud” may satisfy the necessary conditions for an award of attorneys’ fees.  Id. at 30 (citing 
Tamko Roofing, 282 F.3d at 32).  Fishman therefore argued that, “[b]ecause willfulness is less than 
fraud, it should not require the [same] heightened burden of proof.”  Id. at 30.  The First Circuit did 
not address this issue directly, but did describe fraud as “a cousin to willfulness.”  See Fishman 
Transducers, 684 F.3d at 192. 
 131. Brief for Appellees, supra note 15, at 19 (citing Tamko Roofing, 282 F.3d at 29) (noting 
that the Tamko Roofing court quoted the district court’s jury instructions requiring clear and 
convincing evidence to prove willfulness, but conceding that the appellant failed to appeal the issue 
of willfulness). 
 132. Brief for Appellees, supra note 15, at 19—20 (citing Versa Prods. Co., Inc. v. Bifold Co. 
(Mfg.), 50 F.3d 189, 207 (3d Cir. 1995)).  The appellees also cautioned against punishing 
businesses without convincing evidence of wrong-doing.  Id. at 26. 
 133. See Fishman Transducers, 684 F.3d at 190 (stating that Fishman alleged “that the district 
court mishandled the central issue of willfulness”); see also id. at 196 (describing Fishman’s 
alternative argument for receiving an accounting of the defendants’ profits based on the direct 
competition of the parties’ products). 
 134. Fishman Transducers, 684 F.3d at 191.  The opinion makes references to sections 1117 
and 1125, but this Note will refer to each, respectively, as “section 35,” 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2006), 
and “section 43,” 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006), to maintain consistency across cases.  See id. at  
190–91. 
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term is used elsewhere in section 35 and other parts of the Act.135  However, the 
court still recognized that “courts (including this one) have used willfulness as a 
gloss or screen in deciding what remedies to provide for ordinary 
infringement.”136 
Turning to the jury instructions on the burden of proof for willfulness, the 
court declared that the Tamako Roofing court did not adopt a clear and 
convincing standard, as the burden of proof was not contested.137  The court 
recognized the inconsistency among circuits on this matter, comparing the clear 
and convincing standard required by the Third Circuit in Versa Products to the 
preponderance of the evidence standard implemented by the Fourth Circuit 
in Harrods.138  Regardless of the lack of clear authority for Lanham Act cases, 
the court observed that courts tend to set aside the heightened standard unless 
the matter has “constitutional implications.”139  Based on the holdings 
in Herman & MacLean and Grogan, the Fishman court held that the appropriate 
standard is a preponderance of the evidence because Congress did not include 
“willful” in the applicable part of section 35(a).”140 
Unfortunately for Fishman, the court further held that the erroneous jury 
instructions were not harmful because a reasonable jury could not have found 
that the defendant’s conduct was willful under either standard.141  Although the 
 135. Id. at 191.  The court acknowledged that “willful” is used in section 35(a), but only in 
relation to a willful violation of section 43(c), which governs relief for dilution of a famous mark.  
Id.  The court also pointed out that “willful” appears in section 35(c)(2), governing statutory 
damages for the use of counterfeit marks.  Id.  Turning to the language in the relevant provision of 
section 35(a), the court reiterated that “[i]n assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove 
defendant’s sales only.”  Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)). 
 136. Id. (noting that the First Circuit’s exception to the requirement of willfulness applies when 
the parties directly compete).  The court also stated that Fishman was correct in its claim that the 
district court “set the bar too high” with the very definition of willfulness provided to the jury, due 
to the failure “to make clear that objective recklessness is also a basis for finding willfulness.”  Id. 
at 192. 
 137. Id. (citing Tamko Roofing, 282 F.3d at 29) (noting that the Tamako Roofing court briefly 
mentioned the jury’s willfulness finding by clear and convincing evidence, although explaining that 
the statement was not dispositive). 
 138. Id. at 193 & n.7 (citing Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 226–
27 (4th Cir. 2002)); Versa Prods. Co., Inc. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.), 50 F.3d 189, 207–08 (3d Cir. 
1995)). 
 139. Fishman Transducers, 684 F.3d at 192 & n.6.  For example, the court referred to 
Addington v. Texas as a case where the Supreme Court employed the clear and convincing evidence 
burden of proof, thus establishing its use for civil commitment cases.  Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 
441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979)).  Coincidentally, the defendant-appellees previously cited Addington in 
support of their argument that a heightened standard is appropriate for civil cases that focused on 
quasi-criminal claims, such as fraud.  Brief for Appellees, supra note 15, at 25–26 (citing 
Addington, 441 U.S. at 424).  Although the Fishman court did not address this particular claim, the 
Supreme Court dismissed the rationale behind it in Herman & MacLean as being inapplicable to 
“modern lawsuits.”  459 U.S. 375, 388 (1983). 
 140. Fishman Transducers, 684 F.3d at 193. 
 141. Id.  The court explained that the evidence did not even suggest that the appellees’ failure 
to discover the truth about the pickups was reckless, nor did appellee-Paul’s on-air statements imply 
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plaintiff was still denied an accounting of profits under the lower standard, the 
court’s rejection of the Third Circuit’s clear and convincing standard not only 
made for a trademark decision that harmonizes with the legislative history of the 
Lanham Act,142 but one that could have a beneficial impact on plaintiffs in future 
product design trade dress cases as well.143 
III.  THE FIRST CIRCUIT’S SOUND DECISION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, CASE 
LAW, AND POLICY SUPPORT A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE STANDARD 
TO SHOW INTENT IN LANHAM ACT CASES 
A.  The Wisdom of Adhering to the Common Sense Approach of Herman & 
MacLean, Price Waterhouse, and Grogan 
The Supreme Court’s adoption of the preponderance of the evidence standard 
in Herman & MacLean, Price Waterhouse, and Grogan was based on a two-
pronged analysis: (1) statutory interpretation aided by legislative history and (2) 
a balance of interests test used to allocate the risk of an erroneous decision 
between the plaintiff and defendant.144  This practical method of resolving the 
standard of proof for intent was aptly followed by the First Circuit in Fishman 
Transducers.145  Extending the first prong of the Supreme Court’s approach to 
the Lanham Act, the First Circuit appropriately noted that the word “willful” 
was significantly absent from the applicable Lanham Act provision.146  Unlike 
in Harrods, in which the language of section 43(d) called for a showing of “bad 
faith” but not a heightened standard,147 in Fishman Transducers, the relevant 
provision of section 35(a) governing profits did not even refer to intent, much 
less indicate that Congress meant willfulness should be shown by clear and 
convincing evidence.148 
that he had any knowledge of the mistake.  Id. at 193–94.  The court also held that Fishman was 
not entitled to damages because there was insufficient proof to support Fishman’s theory that the 
infringement of its trademark diverted sales from companies that included Fishman pickups in their 
guitars to guitars with infringing pickups, which then caused those companies to reduce new orders 
from Fishman.  Id. at 194–95 (noting the difficulty of showing causation when parties are not in 
direct competition).  Similarly, the court held that Fishman could not receive an accounting of the 
defendants’ profits under the First Circuit’s direct competition rule, because pickups are not an 
equivalent product to a guitar, and therefore the parties were not in direct competition.  Id. at 196. 
 142. See infra Part III.A. 
 143. See infra Part III.B. 
 144. See supra notes 87–89, 92–94, 96–99 and accompanying text. 
 145. See Fishman Transducers, 684 F.3d at 193.  Although the court did not examine the 
Fourth Circuit’s application of this method to the Lanham Act debate in Harrods, it did 
acknowledge Harrods as a case favoring the preponderance standard.  Id. at 193 n.7 (citing Harrods 
Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 226–27 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
 146. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 147. See Harrods, 302 F.3d at 223. 
 148. See Fishman Transducers, 684 F.3d at 142. 
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Although the First Circuit did not address the Lanham Act’s legislative 
history, this history further indicates that Congress did not accidentally omit the 
requirement that an infringer must act with “willfulness and intent to 
deceive.”149  Instead, the requirement’s omission was an intentional change 
made by Congress in reaction to the practical impossibility of enforcing the 
statute section 43(a) replaced, which made a showing of willfulness 
mandatory.150  As Justice Brennan declared in Price Waterhouse, “[w]e need not 
leave our common sense at the doorstep when we interpret a statute.”151  If 
Congress did not intend to require any showing of willfulness, then courts should 
not make that finding more difficult through implementing a standard requiring 
clear and convincing evidence.152 
Turning to the balance of interests, the First Circuit properly indicated that the 
defendants-appellees’ financial interest was not severe enough to raise any red 
flags concerning a potential constitutional matter.153  In Herman & MacLean, an 
accounting firm sought a heightened standard of proof to avoid the poor business 
reputation that would likely follow a finding of securities fraud.154  In Grogan, 
the interest at stake was a bankrupt debtor’s chance for obtaining a “fresh 
start.”155  If the Supreme Court did not deem either of those concerns vital 
enough to demand clear and convincing evidence of intent,156 then the interest 
 149. See Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 648 n.7 (1958) (providing 
a brief overview of legislative history that led to the omission of the willfulness requirement from 
the Lanham Act); MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 27:51 (asserting that Congress purposefully 
removed the willfulness requirement when drafting the Lanham Act). 
 150. See id. 
 151. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989), superseded in part by statute, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g) as recognized in Univ. Of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 
S. Ct. 2517 (2013). 
 152. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text (discussing how the difficultly of proving 
willfulness gave rise to the omission of the willfulness requirement from the Lanham Act); 
Almeling, supra note 9, at 219 (finding no indication of congressional intent to require proof of 
willfulness in the text or legislative history of the Lanham Act); Conway-Jones, supra note 8, at 
924 (“Congress did not intend bad faith to be a requirement for an award of the remedy of an 
accounting of profits . . . .”); Luciani, supra note 8, at 117 (arguing that the requirement of intent 
“seems as if it is a judicial creation, without much guidance from the statute, based on a misguided 
sense of fairness”); Thurmon, supra note 37, at 313–14 (opposing the requirement of willfulness 
for an accounting of the defendant’s profits because it allows infringers to keep unjust gains). 
 153. See Fishmans Transducers, 684 F.3d at 192 & n.6. 
 154. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983) (acknowledging that 
Herman & MacLean could be subject to public condemnation if found guilty of fraud). 
 155. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991). 
 156. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 390 (reasoning that not even the risk of being 
permanently barred from the securities industry warrants a heightened standard of proof to show 
fraud); Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287 (finding that Congress did not intend for the interest of a debtor in 
obtaining a “fresh start” to outweigh the interest of a creditor in receiving rightful repayment). 
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of the defendants-appellees in Fishman Transducers, which was a typical civil 
suit, should likewise not have warranted a heightened standard.157 
Because the primary purpose of the Lanham Act is to protect consumers from 
deception, it would have been reasonable for the First Circuit to also consider 
the public’s interest when assessing the risks presented by a flawed verdict in 
favor of the infringers.158  The court could have bolstered its opinion by 
discussing this aspect of legislative history; even assuming, arguendo, that the 
defendants-appellees’ interest in avoiding higher, insufficiently supported 
damage awards was enough to outweigh Fishman’s interest in adequate relief,159 
it would surely not offset the public’s interest in identifying the origin of 
products.  For instance, in the Coming to America scenario, it is not merely the 
financial loss to McDonald’s that would cause a jury to doubt the fairness of 
allowing Cleo McDowell to retain his profits, but the looks of dismay on the 
faces of bewildered customers wondering why their hamburger buns lack 
sesame seeds.160  Furthermore, to require clear and convincing evidence of an 
infringer’s intent as a precondition to a plaintiff’s recovery of the profits reaped 
from its good name is not in line with Congress’s policies of rewarding quality 
and “making infringement and piracy unprofitable,”161 especially considering 
any difficulties already faced by trademark owners who must prove intent to 
receive a sufficient remedy.162 
B.  The Justification for Applying Fishman Transducers to Future Product 
Design Trade Dress Cases 
Although Fishman Transducers was a trademark case, the court’s dismissal 
of Versa Products on similar grounds indicates that the First Circuit will employ 
a preponderance of the evidence standard to show willfulness in future product 
 157. See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 387 (explaining that in “a typical civil suit for money 
damages” only a preponderance of the evidence is required). 
 158. See S. REP. NO. 133, at 5–6 (1946); see also Rogers, supra note 27, at 176–77 (contending 
that consumers would be harmed without trademark protection because they would be hardpressed 
to distinguish between products); James S. Wrona, False Advertising and Consumer Standing 
Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: Broad Consumer Protection Legislation or a Narrow Pro-
Competitive Measure?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1085, 1153–54 (1995) (asserting that “deceptive 
advertising is destructive to the principles of capitalism” and causes consumers to inefficiently 
allocate resources to differentiate between valid and invalid claims). 
 159. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 161. S. REP. NO. 1333, at 3–4 (1946); see also Conway-Jones, supra note 8, at 882 (contending 
that remedying infringement with an accounting of profits “instill[s] faith in the competitive 
marketplace”). 
 162. See Michael J. Freno, Trademark Valuation: Preserving Brand Equity, 97 TRADEMARK 
REP. 1055, 1062 (2007) (reasoning that  injunctions  are granted more frequently in Lanham Act 
cases because it is more difficult to prove the requisites for a monetary remedy); Thurmon, supra 
note 37, at 313 (explaining that under-compensation is a problem when monetary remedies are 
granted in Lanham Act cases because of the difficulty in quantifying damages and proving willful 
infringement). 
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design trade dress cases as well.163  Presuming the Versa Products court was 
correct in its theory that Lanham Act protection of product designs leads to 
“hobbled” competition,164 this threat to market participants could add weight to 
the infringer’s side in a balance of interests test and strengthen the argument for 
a heightened standard to allocate the risk of such occurrence.165 
However, accepting this theory may be problematic because, before the Third 
Circuit applied Sears and Compco to justify the clear and convincing evidence 
standard, it conceded that the actual holdings of Sears and Compco did not 
prevent Section 43(a) from protecting product configuration.166  If the Supreme 
Court was concerned only with a clash between state laws and federal patent 
legislation in Sears and Compco, then a policy derived from those opinions 
should not affect the burden of proof required to show intent in a Lanham Act 
case.167 
Nevertheless, according to Versa Products, “patent-like restrictions on 
competition” are created when courts enforce Lanham Act protection of product 
designs.168  In such cases, it is true that, as stated in Sears, the “mere inability of 
the public to tell two identical articles apart is not enough to support . . . an award 
of damages for copying that which the federal patent laws permit to be 
copied.”169  But this line of reasoning ignores the fact that courts, like the 
Seventh Circuit in Kohler, may already assiduously apply the likelihood of 
confusion, functionality, and distinctiveness tests to determine whether Lanham 
Act protection of a product’s design would trigger any conflict with patent 
legislation.170  Therefore, there is no need to forestall patent-like restrictions by 
imposing a heightened standard of proof because, through implementation of 
these well-tested methods of ascertaining Lanham Act protection, such 
restrictions cannot materialize.171 
 163. See Versa Prods. Co., Inc. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.) Ltd., 50 F.3d 189, 207–08 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 164. Id. 
 165. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (quoting Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)) (“[W]e are mindful that ‘a standard of proof serves to allocate 
the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate 
decision.’”). 
 166. Versa Prods., 50 F.3d at 204 n.12. 
 167. See id.; see also Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 887, 936 (1988) (explaining that, “because [Sears and Compco] involved state law, 
there was no reason in those case to balance potentially countervailing federal policies” such as the 
Lanham Act). 
 168. Versa Prods., 50 F.3d at 207. 
 169. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964). 
 170. Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 642 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco 
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774–75 (1992)). 
 171. See Kohler, 12 F.3d at 642 (explaining that a trademark monopoly can be avoided by 
carefully applying trademark recognition principles); see also Dratler, supra note 167, at 936 
(maintaining that trademark law should “be harmonized with design patent law” by means of “a 
sensitive application of such fact-bound principles as likelihood of confusion, functionality, and 
distinctiveness”); Jay Dratler, Jr., Trade Dress Protection for Product Configurations: Is There A 
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A defendant could nevertheless correctly point out that one of these methods, 
the test of distinctiveness, falls short of preventing harm to competition when 
applied to product designs.172  As stated in Versa Products, “federal patent laws 
restrict[] the degree to which courts may grant legal recognition of consumer 
reliance on [designs] as source indicators,” as it is rare for consumers to actually 
rely on  designs to identify source at all.173  This led the Third Circuit to 
implement a stricter test for assessing consumer confusion, accompanied by a 
heightened standard of proof to show intent to confuse.174  However, by 
requiring plaintiffs to prove that their design has acquired secondary meaning, 
the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart resolved the concern over product designs 
lacking inherent distinctiveness.175  In the process the Court defined “the only 
trade-dress-law difference” that must be addressed in such cases.176  Because 
this ruling eliminates “plausible threats” of product design suits that allege 
inherent distinctiveness,177 there is no need to implement a heightened standard 
of proof to minimize the risk of impaired competition that could result from such 
frivolous claims.178  In Coming to America, for example, if McDonald’s was to 
claim that the shape formed by the unique layering of its Big Mac ingredients 
deserves trade dress protection,179 then in addition to showing that McDowell’s 
version looks confusingly similar, McDonald’s would have to prove that its 
burger’s shape developed a secondary meaning among consumers through its 
use in the market.180  To also impose a heightened standard of proof on 
McDonald’s burden of showing intent to confuse would be overkill, despite Mr. 
McDowell’s fervent insistence.181 
Conflict with Patent Policy?, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 427, 495–495 (1996) (reasoning that existing 
trademark doctrines are sufficient to protect product configurations and will not hamper patent 
policy); Peter E. Mims, Promotional Goods and the Functionality Doctrine: An Economic Model 
of Trademarks, 63 TEX. L. REV. 639, 645 (1984) (asserting that under the functionality doctrine 
confers protection by preventing trademark monopolies). 
 172. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 173. Versa Prods., 50 F.3d at 204 (reasoning that consumers are more likely to consider a 
product’s packaging and advertising than its configuration when determining the product’s source). 
 174. Id. at 208. 
 175. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000). 
 176. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 633 n.10 
(6th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). 
 177. See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213. 
 178. Cf. id.; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 8:12.50 (affirming that the Supreme Court 
in Wal-Mart purposely limited the scope of product design and trade dress lawsuits by imposing a 
heightened burden on the plaintiffs). 
 179. Cf. Lisa K. Krizman, Trademark Protection for Restaurant Owners: Having Your Cake 
and Trademarking It, Too, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 1004, 1026–27 (2009) (discussing the protection 
of distinctive shapes of food, such as “goldfish crackers” and “car-shaped lasagna,” under the 
Lanham Act). 
 180. See supra notes 1, 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra note 1. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
By holding that a preponderance of the evidence is the proper standard of 
proof to establish willful infringement, the First Circuit demonstrated 
consistency with the Lanham Act’s anti-infringement policy.  Following the 
guidance of Herman & MacLean and its progeny, the Fishman Traducers court 
laid out a common sense approach that provided for a sensible decision.182  Even 
in future product design suits, the traditional methods of establishing Lanham 
Act protection will prevent risks of patent-like restrictions that could otherwise 
justify a clear and convincing standard. 
This decision will provide trademark and trade dress owners with fair access 
to sufficient remedies, and should therefore be deemed as highly persuasive by 
other circuits that consider the issue in the future.  Of course, in cases 
like Fishman Transducers, in which evidence of intentional infringement is 
virtually nonexistent, a lower standard of proof will ultimately make no 
difference in the outcome.  Along those lines, returning to the unfortunate 
situation of Cleo McDowell, even courts that demonstrate unwavering devotion 
to the heightened standard may not be able to help the avid restaurateur avoid a 
finding that he intended to profit from the reputation of his well-known, and 
well-lawyered, corporate adversary. 
 182. See Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul, 684 F.3d 187, 193 (1st Cir. 2012). 
                                                            
